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Against those who would either identify genealogy with reductive genealogical debunking 
or deny it any evaluative and action-guiding significance, I argue for the following three 
claims: that although genealogies, true to their Enlightenment origins, tend to trace the 
higher to the lower, they need not reduce the higher to the lower, but can elucidate the 
relation between them and put us in a position to think more realistically about both relata; 
that if we think of genealogy’s normative significance in terms of a triadic model that 
includes the genealogy’s addressee, we can see that in tracing the higher to the lower, a 
genealogy can facilitate an evaluation of the higher element, and where the lower element 
is some important practical need rather than some sinister motive, the genealogy can even 
be vindicatory; and finally, that vindicatory genealogies, unlike subversive genealogies, offer 
positive guidance for how to move forward. 
1. Higher and Lower, Reason and Power 
What is genealogy? A genealogy is a developmental narrative describing how a 
cultural phenomenon—such as a concept, value, practice or institution—could have 
come about. The phrase “could have come about” is helpfully equivocal between 
three senses here, covering not only actual, but also conjectural and even 
counterfactual developments: if the emergence of the phenomenon in question falls 
within the scope of recorded history, a genealogy may patiently thread together a 
selection of documented events that elucidate whatever shape the phenomenon now 
takes in terms of how it actually came by it. But given philosophers’ interest in ideas 
and practices that are so fundamental to human life that they have often long 
emerged already even in the oldest documented societies, genealogists seeking to 
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start further back may have to make do with speculations about the distant past, and 
then they will contribute to that second genre, which the Scottish philosopher 
Dugald Stewart termed “conjectural history” (1858, 34).1 Practitioners of the third 
genre of genealogy, finally, seek to elucidate a cultural phenomenon by imagining 
how and why it could or could not have developed. Genealogies beginning in a 
hypothetical “state of nature”—or some equivalent of it, such as Philip Pettit’s (2018) 
‘Erewhon’, a Butlerian anagram of “nowhere”—are examples of such developmental 
narratives that still seek to explain why things in fact are as they are, but by 
considering explicitly counterfactual stages of genealogical development.2 
 It may seem strange to lump together avowedly imaginary genealogies with 
genealogies that at least profess to be historically accurate. But it is not that the 
genealogists describing counterfactual developments—who include David Hume 
(2000), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1977), E. J. Craig (1990, 1993), Bernard Williams 
(1997, 2002), Miranda Fricker (2007), and Philip Pettit (2018, forthcoming)—do not 
care about real history. It is rather that for some philosophical purposes, they find it 
best not to start out from over-specific and under-supported speculations about a 
particular point in pre-history, such as the Fertile Crescent in the late Pleistocene. 
They prefer to start from more generic and less contentious idealizations of human 
communities. Abstracting away from the peculiarities of particular stretches of 
human history, these idealizations aim to embody highly general and structural 
 
1  See Marušić (2017) for a nuanced discussion of Stewart’s conception of conjectural 
history. 
2 Similarly capacious conceptions of genealogy as encompassing imaginary developments 
are proposed by Williams (2002, 20; 2009, 210), Craig (2007), Owen (2010), Blackburn 
(2016, “genealogy”), and Lightbody (2021). For a more Foucauldian framework for 
thinking about different types of genealogy, see Bevir (2008) and Koopman (2009, 2011, 
2013).  
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dynamics that are plausibly at work in any human community. Much as scientists 
find it expedient to investigate the behaviour of real gases by starting from an ideal 
gas model whose point particles move without being subject to various forces that 
real particles would be subject to, these state-of-nature genealogists use a fictional 
model to truthfully identify highly generic and explanatorily basic dynamics at the 
root of certain cultural phenomena. And as Williams’s genealogy in particular 
illustrates,3 a fictional model than can then still be lowered into the stream of history 
to consider how the generic dynamics it embodies were concretely realized, 
elaborated, transformed, extended, and differentiated in particular times and 
places.4 
 Genealogies setting out from state-of-nature models are thus “histories of the 
present,” in Michel Foucault’s phrase, but they move from the socio-historically 
generic to the socio-historically specific and from the explanatorily basic to the 
explanatorily derivative. This can serve various functions. It allows genealogists to 
reveal both why there is a near-universal need for a cultural phenomenon to develop 
in some form across many different societies and why it takes a certain form here 
rather than another. But it can also serve to bring out, in an uncluttered and 
 
3 “The idea is that although you can make these absolutely schematic, basic needs for [the] 
virtues [of truth] clear at the level of what I call the state of nature—that is, by pure 
reflection on the needs of human communication—they are, in fact, to an enormous degree 
changed, transformed, differently embodied, extended and so on by historical experience. 
And a fundamental claim of the book is … that if we’re going to understand the puzzles 
that surround these concepts now … [we] can only understand them through a historical 
knowledge of the concept[s]” (Williams 2007, 132). See also Williams (2006a, 191–92; 
2014). 
4 I develop a systematic account of how genealogies can combine fiction and history in this 
way in Queloz (2021b). 
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particularly striking way, why a cultural phenomenon has some otherwise puzzling 
feature: one way to show why a certain value needs to develop into an intrinsic value, 
for example, is to imagine a situation in which it is understood merely as an 
instrumental value, and demonstrate just why that would not be a stable resting 
point. Or a hypothetical genealogical narrative might serve to show that certain 
explanatory resources are sufficient to account for a phenomenon’s emergence in 
principle, thereby suggesting that while the phenomenon’s actual history was 
doubtless more complex and erratic, even a less simplified account of it need not 
invoke radically different explanatory resources: it can do without assuming 
extraordinary feats of foresight and planning, or ascribing special faculties of 
intuition, or wheeling in an entire new class of entities or facts just to explain why 
we think and speak in certain terms.5 
 The heyday of genealogy in all three guises was the Enlightenment.6 Jean le Rond 
d’Alembert, in his programmatic Discours préliminaire to the Encyclopédie, used the 
metaphor of “genealogy” to describe the method of “remounting to the origin and 
genesis of our ideas” (1751, i) and declared that all ideas and branches of knowledge 
ultimately trace back to human needs, though they were slower to appear the more 
remote or difficult to satisfy the needs were.7 David Hume similarly proposed to 
 
5 Williams maintains that a hypothetical story can do this even if the story is not merely 
fictional, but impossible: even a strictly impossible genealogy doing without certain 
resources can suggest that a historical story could be told that “also did without them, and 
called on no more input” (2000, 157). 
6 See Tuck (1979, 174), Lifschitz (2012), Hont (2015), Palmeri (2016), and Sagar (2018). On 
genealogy as an epistemological topos, see Weigel (2003); also available in English in Weigel 
(2006). 
7 See D’Alembert (1751, xiv). A splendid illustration of the genealogical order of ideas was 
published in Pierre Mouchon’s Table analytique et raisonnée of the Encyclopédie (though 
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explain ideas and virtues that appeared to be the product of human contrivance, 
such as property and justice, by exhibiting them as remedies to inconveniences 
resulting from the concurrence of certain human needs and circumstances.8 As 
Stewart noted towards the end of the Scottish Enlightenment, genealogical 
explanations of “society in all its various aspects” had been “the peculiar glory of the 
latter half of the eighteenth century” (1854, 70). He particularly associated this 
“particular sort of enquiry,” which he considered to be of “entirely of modern origin” 
(1858, 33), with Hume’s The Natural History of Religion ([1757] 2008) and Adam 
Smith’s Dissertation on the Origin of Languages ([1761] 1853). But the same period 
also saw the publication of many other works that might be described as genealogies 
of cultural phenomena, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discours sur l’origine et les 
fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes ([1755] 1977), Isaak Iselin’s Über die 
Geschichte der Menschheit (1764) or Immanuel Kant’s Mutmaßlicher Anfang der 
Menschengeschichte ([1786] 1900–, VIII, 109–23). 
 One important respect in which the spirit of the Enlightenment informs 
genealogy as a method is that genealogical inquiry typically serves (in Nietzsche’s 
phrase) to translate humanity back into nature.9 Genealogy reflects Enlightenment 
 
Mouchon, a pastor in Geneva and Basel, was manifestly less critical of Christian doctrine 
than the more materialist among the encyclopédistes). The genealogical tree is available 
here: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/content/arbre-généalogique. 
8 See Hume (2000), in particular Book III, Part II, Section II, entitled “Of the origin of justice 
and property.” I offer a reconstruction of Hume’s genealogical method and its rationale in 
Queloz (2021b, ch. 4), but many Hume scholars have come to regard Hume as pioneering 
genealogist: Lottenbach (1996), Wiggins (2006, ch. 2), and Blackburn (2013, 78) describe 
Hume as offering a “genealogy of morals”; Price (2008) focuses on Hume’s “genealogy of 
modals,” while Kail (2016) reads Hume as pursuing a “genealogical naturalism.”  
9 See Nietzsche (2002, §230). 
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naturalism by presenting even the loftiest cultural phenomena, which seem to call 
for explanation in terms of transcendent origins in a Platonic Heaven of Forms or 
in the Mind of God, as being part of nature and fully explainable in terms of the rest 
of nature.10 As Hume announces already in the title of his genealogy of religion, 
Enlightenment genealogy is not just history, but natural history:11 it seeks to explain 
even the most exalted things as arising naturally, without mysterious saltations or 
divine interventions. 
 As a result of this Enlightenment naturalism, genealogies characteristically trace 
the higher to the lower: they take some of our loftiest abstractions, such as the 
concepts of reason, truth, knowledge, justice, virtue, or intrinsic value, and reveal 
their lowly origins in the will to power, prudence, self-interest, or instrumental 
value. Enlightenment genealogies do precisely not explain the higher in terms of 
equally high origins, as would befit it; they bring it down to earth, revealing its roots 
to be firmly anchored in human soil. The higher/lower distinction should not be 
taken too seriously, and it may not consciously figure in the minds of genealogists 
or their addressees. But it does give theorists of genealogy a useful way to generalize 
over the explanantia and explanda of genealogies, and in particular one which 
registers the clear hierarchical ordering within the otherwise haphazard collection 
of items—needs, interests, wills, drives, affects, concepts, beliefs, values, virtues, 
practices, institutions, etc.—that figure in genealogies: the explanandum is typically 
something highly respected, valued, refined, and exalted, perhaps even something 
 
10 As Avi Lifschitz puts it, Enlightenment genealogies are characteristically animated by a 
naturalistic concern “to present human artifice as natural—or to explain how human beings 
have naturally crafted their cultural and material environments” (2012, 5). 
11 See Hume (2008). See Kail (2007, 2009, 2016) and Russell (2008) for discussions of 
Hume’s genealogical approach to religion. 
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seemingly transcendent or god-like, but at the very least something that is a 
prerogative of human beings, a distinguishing mark of our humanity—these are the 
things most likely to call for genealogical explanation, after all; the explanans, by 
contrast, is typically something less mysterious, but also less respected and valued: 
something ordinary, mundane, and firmly immanent—something all too human, 
perhaps, or else something we share with other animals. On a common view of 
genealogy, it is just the fact that the explananda and explanantia of genealogies fall 
into this pattern of higher and lower that gives genealogies their destabilizing or 
debunking character. Foucault seems to suggest as much in an oft-quoted passage: 
“historical beginnings are lowly … capable of undoing every infatuation” (1971, 
149). 
 But there are two aspects here that need untangling. The first and most basic way 
in which genealogy can become destabilizing is through the very act of 
genealogizing, in particular when something is historicized that resists 
historicization: even raising the question of a phenomenon’s historical origins can 
have an unsettling effect if that phenomenon denies the question applicability by 
presenting itself as eternal or ahistorical. This is one reason why, at the time of the 
publication of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality ([1887] 1998), the very 
pairing of “genealogy” with “morality” was provocative in much the same way that 
Darwin’s pairing of “origin” with “species” had been nearly three decades earlier. On 
the traditional Christian worldview, neither morality nor species were supposed to 
have origins at all, at least not in this distinctly worldly or sublunary sense—as the 
Foucauldian distinction marks the difference, they were supposed to have an 
Ursprung, a High Origin in the hands of the creator, but not an Entstehung, a 
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historical emergence. 12  Christian morality set itself up for a fall by resting its 
authority on a claim to being a timeless revelation while simultaneously enjoining 
its adherents to be reflective and truthful, since this was bound eventually to issue 
in their becoming reflective and truthful about the history of their own values.13 
 Yet in tracing the higher to the lower, genealogy can seem to add insult to 
historicization: it treats these exalted phenomena not only as having a history, but 
as having a history tracing back to lower things, such as the base drives and needs 
that human beings share with other animals. In the eyes of those who regard the 
most exalted phenomena as timeless givens that are categorically distinct from the 
lowly world of becoming, a genealogy tracing the higher to lowly practical needs is 
therefore doubly irreverent. It dispels the higher’s pretensions to purity from 
mundane motives. 
 Here an important distinction beckons, however, namely that between reductive 
and non-reductive genealogies. It is one thing to reveal the higher to have an 
explanatory connection to the lower; quite another to reveal the higher to be just 
another version of the lower masquerading as the higher. A reductive genealogy 
reduces the higher to the lower, pulling the mask from the higher and thereby 
revealing it to be another instantiation of the lower masquerading as the higher: the 
will to truth is unmasked as the will to power, justice as prudence, selflessness as 
selfishness, intrinsic as instrumental value. Genealogy then appears as an 
application of the old rhetorical device that Quintilian, in his Institutio Oratoria, 
 
12 See Foucault (1971). He attributes the distinction to Nietzsche, but it is truer to the spirit 
than the letter of Nietzsche’s works, since Nietzsche’s own use of the terms “Ursprung” and 
“Entstehung” or “Herkunft” does not appear to track any such distinction. 
13 See Nietzsche (2005a, Beyond, §2 ); see also Williams (2000, 160) and Queloz and Cueni 
(2019, §2). 
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dubbed paradiastole: one evaluative description of a phenomenon is replaced by a 
redescription that casts the phenomenon in a very different evaluative light.14 
 One way to deploy genealogy in this reductive fashion is to debunk the lofty 
ideals of the Enlightenment itself. Enlightenment genealogizing can be turned back 
on itself, revealing a tension between the fuel and the findings of genealogical 
inquiry. This in-house tension makes itself felt, for example, when Kant defends 
metaphysics’ claim to being the Queen of the sciences against Locke’s attempt to 
undermine that claim by imputing an unflattering “genealogy” to the purported 
Queen, tracing her “birth” to “the rabble of common experience” (1998, A ix). Locke 
was mistaken in his genealogizing, Kant assures us, but he concedes that if Locke’s 
genealogy had been accurate, the Queen’s pretensions would “rightly have been 
rendered suspicious” (1998, A ix). This tension between rationalist and empiricist or 
naturalistic currents of thought is what leads Robert Brandom to describe genealogy 
as the “revenge of Enlightenment naturalism on Enlightenment rationalism” (2015, 
3): if Enlightenment rationalism precipitated the disenchantment of the world 
through reason, genealogy provoked the disillusionment with reason; if the 
eighteenth century was the Age of Reason, the nineteenth century, with the advent 
of Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche, and Freud, became the Age of the Great Unmaskers.15  
 A non-reductive genealogy, by contrast, presents the higher as genuinely distinct 
from the lower, but reveals a connection between the two which helps explain why 
the lower gave rise to, or favoured the retention of, the higher. Williams’s genealogy 
of the value of truth offers a clear illustration of an explicitly non-reductive 
 
14 On genealogy as paradiastolic redescription, see also Skinner (2002, 185), Owen (2018), 
Srinivasan (2019, 144), and Queloz (2021a, 302).  
15 See also Saar (2007) and Brassier (2016) for a discussion of this use of genealogy to 
unmask. 
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genealogy. The genealogy takes a higher element—in this case, truth as an intrinsic 
value, which is to say the attitude of valuing the truth for its own sake, so that one 
has a pro tanto reason to seek and tell the truth because it is the truth—and traces it 
to various lower elements: most basically, the fundamental human concern to obtain 
information about one’s immediate environment and the risks and opportunities it 
affords. As Williams’s genealogy brings out, someone who thinks of truth as an 
intrinsic value will behave differently from someone who does not—she will be more 
disposed to invest effort in finding out the truth even when it is otherwise of no use 
to her, or tell the truth to others even when she does not herself stand to gain from 
it and would be better served by keeping it to herself. If people were truthful only 
insofar as it served their concerns for things other than the truth, communication 
would be a great deal less cooperative, since we have all kinds of reasons not to tell 
the truth all the time. This is the basis of Voltaire’s cynical quip that “people employ 
language only to conceal their thoughts” (1869, 82).16 If it is to stake a claim against 
self-interest, therefore, the truth must be understood as valuable for its own sake—
as being its own reward.  
 The upshot of Williams’s genealogy is that the attitude of valuing the truth 
intrinsically stands in an instrumental relation to simpler and more basic concerns: 
by having many people in a society value the truth for its own sake, many other, less 
lofty concerns are indirectly being served, such as the concern to have access to a 
rich and reliable pool of information with which to meet one’s basic needs. But the 
fact that the attitude of valuing the truth intrinsically stands in this instrumental 
 
16  Similar bons mots have been attributed to Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, 
Edward Young, Oliver Goldsmith, Robert South, and others. Voltaire’s version has the 
advantage that it does not deny that truth-telling is a basic purpose of language—in fact, 
the joke turns on it. 
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relation to these other concerns does not debunk that attitude as a delusion; on the 
contrary, it helps explain why it makes perfectly good sense for a society really to 
cultivate this attitude: it is only insofar as truthfulness is understood as an end in 
itself that it can serve as a means to other ends. And if, like Williams, we explain the 
existence of values in terms of the existence of human valuations, then the fact that 
a society has good reason to treat the truth as an intrinsic value and possesses the 
hermeneutic and affective resources to make sense of it as an intrinsic value just is 
for it to be an intrinsic value in that society, and not just a mere illusion or pretence.17 
 A non-reductive genealogy, which traces the higher to the lower in the sense of 
explaining the higher in terms of the lower, does therefore precisely not collapse the 
higher element into the lower. Rather, it helps us understand why the lower element 
would lead a genuinely new element to arise or be retained in some form over the 
course of history. One important way in which genealogy can do that is by revealing 
the instrumental dependences between the higher and the lower element: the respects 
in which one element serves the other. But the fact that the higher element is 
instrumental to the satisfaction of the lower element need not mean that the higher 
element, when correctly understood, must be seen as nothing but a dressed-up 
version of the lower. The search for the truth may be motivated in good part by the 
desire for fame, as James Watson candidly admits in his account of the discovery of 
the structure of DNA.18 But the presence of an ulterior motive need not undermine 
the more immediate motive. Even if the search for truth is driven by a desire for 
fame, this does not reduce one to the other as long as what one desires to be famous 
 
17 See Williams (2002, 92; 2006b, 137). I elaborate on this point in Queloz (2018; 2021b, ch. 
7). 
18 See Watson (1968). 
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for is having found out the truth.19  
 In fact, the mere observation of a link between high-minded concerns and more 
worldly ones cannot rationally undermine the high-minded concerns unless it 
receives succour from a further assumption: the assumption that high-minded 
concerns, to be the genuine article, should not have any such ties to lowly concerns. 
It is on the back of the conviction that the higher should remain entirely pure of the 
lower that revealing the higher’s roots in the lower casts doubt on its high standing. 
Judith Shklar observes of genealogy in the original sense: “To recognize the 
destructive possibilities of genealogy one must also appreciate the pride in noble 
ancestors”; “it is because origins can glorify that they can also defame” (1972, 129–
30). The point generalizes to genealogies of cultural phenomena. It is typically the 
antecedent pride in purity of origin that lends genealogies dragging their target 
through the mud their defamatory power. Genealogical debunking is enabled by the 
purist assumption that the higher must have higher origins. 
 But instead of facilely leveraging this purist assumption, sophisticated 
genealogists from Nietzsche through Foucault to Williams reject it as betraying a 
kind of weakness and failure to face up to reality. Nietzsche castigates what he calls 
“the metaphysicians’ basic faith, the faith in the opposition of values,” which is the 
conviction that “[t]hings of the highest value must have another, separate origin of 
their own,—they cannot be derived from this ephemeral, seductive, deceptive, lowly 
world, from this mad chaos of confusion and desire” (2002, §2).20 While he seeks to 
criticize Christian values in light of their genealogy, he does not take them to be 
 
19 A point that Williams (2002, 142) presses against reductive interpretations of work in the 
sociology of knowledge. 
20 Compare also Nietzsche (1986, I, §1; 2002, §230; 2005b, Reason, §4). 
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undermined simply by their lowly origins: “inquiry into the origin of our evaluations 
… is in no way identical with a critique of them” (2009, 1885, 2[189]), he points out. 
“One could have proven ever so unflattering things about the origins of moral 
valuations: now that these forces are here, they can be used and have their value as 
forces” (2009, 1886, 7[6]). 21  In a similar vein, Foucault remarks: “I have done 
nothing other than write the history of psychiatry to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Why should so many people, including psychiatrists, believe that I am an 
antipsychiatrist? It’s because they are not able to accept the real history of their 
institutions, which is, of course, a sign of psychiatry being a pseudoscience. A real 
science is able to accept even the shameful, dirty stories of its beginning” (1988, 15). 
And Williams regards it as a weakness to be unable to accept that the things we prize 
have humble beginnings and are entangled with lower things: “To suppose that the 
values of truthfulness, reasonableness, and other such things that we prize or 
suppose ourselves to prize, are simply revealed to us or given to us by our nature, is 
not only a philosophical superstition, but a kind of weakness” (1995, 148).22 By 
rejecting both the reduction of the higher to the lower and the purist assumption 
that any explanatory connection with the lower impugns the higher, these 
genealogists clear a path for genealogies that explain the higher without explaining 
it away. 
 Even when a genealogy is ostensibly reductive, moreover, the more charitable and 
interesting reading may be one on which it is ultimately non-reductive. Post-
modernist genealogists like Foucault, in particular, are routinely understood as 
 
21 See also the better-known passage in Book Five of The Gay Science (Nietzsche 2001, 
§345). 
22 This is connected with Williams’s Nietzschean “pessimism of strength” (2011, 190). See 
Queloz (2021b, 187–92) and Krishnan and Queloz (manuscript). 
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trying to argue from the observation that the boundary between the force of reason 
and the force of power is not always clear-cut to the conclusion that there is no real 
distinction between reason and power, and that reason must reduce to power. But 
as Amy Allen (2017, 187) and Daniele Lorenzini (2022) have recently emphasized, 
Foucault himself is not best understood as reducing reason to power. He explores the 
relation between the two, but it remains a relation between two non-identical relata. 
As he unequivocally puts it in an interview with Gérard Raulet: “studying their 
relation is precisely my problem. If they were identical, I would not have to study 
them and I would be spared a lot of fatigue as a result. The very fact that I pose the 
question of their relation proves clearly that I do not identify them” (1998, 455).23 
 Admittedly, however, a genealogy investigating the relations between reason and 
power as Foucault does may leave one unable to continue to accept the opposition 
between the higher and the lower element in its original form. Even if genealogies 
do not reduce the higher to the lower, they tend not to leave everything where it 
was—that is part of the point of telling them. And if the original opposition 
conceived of the force of reason as completely unconditioned by and exclusive of 
merely causal power, then a Foucauldian picture will indeed force us to conclude 
that, on the terms of that opposition, everything is power. 
 Yet what this shows is not that Foucault’s genealogical account is reductive after 
all, but that the model on which we classify genealogies into reductive and non-
reductive ones, just as we classify sonnets into Petrarchan and Shakespearean ones, 
is too simple. One and the same genealogy can be reductive in one sense and non-
 
23  In this passage, Foucault is talking more specifically about the relation between 
knowledge and power, but on his account, knowledge is one of the principal forms that 
reason takes. 
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reductive in another: it can collapse the higher into the lower in one sense but not 
in another. 
 To capture this complexity, we can redeploy the distinction between reductive 
and non-reductive as a distinction between two phases in genealogical reflection. In 
the first, reductive phase, genealogical reflection shows us that as we conceived the 
opposition between the higher and lower elements, the higher reduces to the lower, 
so that the lower is all there is. But recognizing that everything we thought was 
higher is really a form of the lower is but a first step. In the second, non-reductive 
phase, we can resituate the original opposition within the lower, and thereby come to 
see that, on the more realistic understanding of the opposition that the genealogy 
suggests, the higher and the lower are, though more similar to each other than we 
originally thought, still far from identical. 
 What a genealogical exploration of the relation between reason and power 
encourages us to do, then, is to resituate the opposition between the force of reason 
and the force of power within the de-idealized world that the genealogy has laid 
bare—or, more accurately, it encourages us to realize that this less pure-minded 
distinction is the one that was being drawn in practice all along. If relations of power 
pervade even the clearest manifestations of the force of reason, we need not reject 
any and all attempts to contrast reason with power; we might instead “resituate the 
original opposition in a new space, so that the real differences can emerge between 
the force which is argument and the force which is not—differences such as that 
between listening and being hit, a contrast that may vanish in the seminar but which 
reappears sharply when you are hit” (Williams 2002, 9). In contrasting and 
interrogating the relation between the operation of reasons and the operation of 
causes, we need not think of the operation of reasons as floating free of the operation 
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of causes. As Williams emphasizes, “hoping that public political discussion should 
be moderately rational and should address the reasons of individuals and groups” is 
not necessarily to be “committed to the nonsense of supposing that it could be 
transcendentally air-lifted out of the world of persuasion and power” (2006c, 117–
18). We do not have to start from Platonic or Kantian conceptions of pure reason as 
something essentially unadulterated by causal forces that needs to be isolated and 
protected from distortion by power. We can start instead from a picture on which 
power is everywhere, being constitutively involved even in the most supremely 
rational forms of thinking and communicating, and understand appeals to reason 
and rational argument as encouraging some expressions of power over other 
expressions of power. On this picture, we grant that even the clearest instances of 
rational belief-formation still take place within relations of power, and can never be 
entirely free of the influence of such extra-rational forces as affect, desire, emotion, 
charisma, or social status. But we draw the distinction between being moved by 
reasons and being moved by other forces within those expressions of power. To use 
a term that helpfully covers the middle ground between the extremes of being 
moved by reason alone and being merely coerced by irrational forces, we draw a 
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable forms of persuasion. 
 Crucially, however, which forms of persuasion to accept and encourage and 
which to reject and discourage is not something that can be determined simply on 
the basis of a metaphysical account of the nature of reason or rational argument: it 
is an ineliminably ethical and political question. The task is not just a matter of 
finding out what pure reason objectively amounts to before proceeding to keep it 
free of distorting interferences from non-rational forces. Rational forces are 
inextricably bound up with—indeed, enabled and supported by—non-rational ones, 
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and the social task of determining which combinations to accept and foster and 
which ones to reject and sanction is not one that can be completed once and for all, 
without drawing on other values, but a continual and context-sensitive task that 
essentially draws on the rest of a society’s values. Certainly, a concept or a belief 
should not be discredited just because its formation or acquisition is in part the effect 
of someone’s power. That would invalidate far too much. Nor can we simply reject 
any concept- or belief-formation involving coercion or emotional manipulation, 
because that would once again exclude too much. Williams points to successful 
education as a prime example of partly coercive but benign persuasion: 
… as the ancient Greeks well knew, the power of persuasion, however benignly or 
rationally exercised, is still a species of power. Even if we can separate rational from less 
rational considerations deployed in persuasion, there is little reason to suppose that we 
can separate a rational from an irrational agency of persuasion. … The point is very clear 
with education. Pupils enter education, most often, under some kind of coercion, and 
some of them stay in it and listen only for those same reasons. If they have a good teacher, 
those reasons fall away, but the good teacher will have substituted other powers of 
persuasion for those. Much successful education, after all, is a benign form of seduction. 
(2002, 226) 
We cannot distinguish acceptable from unacceptable forms of persuasion simply by 
considering how our practices live up to some Platonic ideal of reason that is pure 
of power, or an Ideal Speech Situation à la Habermas that is free of Herrschaft. A 
better picture is one which “everything is, if you like, persuasion, and the aim is to 
encourage some forms of it rather than others” (Williams 1995, 148). This, as 
Williams notes, “is not a technical task, like clearing a radio channel of static. It is a 
practical and ethical task, like deciding who can speak, how and when” (1995, 148). 
The difference that leads us to accept the power of education and political debate but 
not the power of brainwashing and gaslighting is not just a technical difference to 
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be discovered through sufficiently close scrutiny of the processes involved 
(important as this close scrutiny no doubt is). The difference is also, and essentially, 
an ethical and political difference that we are continually making and renegotiating 
in the light of our evolving social situation and our other values and convictions.  
 In thus changing our understanding not just of the relation between the higher 
and the lower, but of the very relata, genealogy counteracts the ever-present 
temptation to inflate mere distinctions into dichotomies.24 A distinction may have a 
range of useful applications, but it need not carry with it the expectation that it must 
always and everywhere be clear-cut, or even applicable at all. Once paired with this 
expectation, however, the distinction becomes a dichotomy, suggesting a 
fundamental and ubiquitous gulf in the fabric of things—a metaphysical dualism, of 
which the Cartesian dualism of mind and body is the paradigm example. And as 
Brandom notes, the mark of a metaphysical dualism is that the relation between the 
distinguished items has become unintelligible or at least mysterious.25 
 A genealogy making intelligible how the higher relates to the lower, and why the 
two would come to be distinguished in the first place, can help dispel this air of 
mystery and deflate the dichotomy along with its concomitant dualism. It puts us in 
a position to understand the distinction as a distinction rather than as a dichotomy—
a distinction that is not necessarily always clear-cut, and not necessarily always 
applicable, but that we may nevertheless come to draw in certain situations for good 
reasons that the genealogy can bring to light. Genealogical reflection will then begin 
by reductively debunking an inflated conception of the distinction as a sharp 
 
24 A helpful contrast that Hilary Putnam adapts from John Dewey; see Putnam (2002, 7–
11). 
25 See Brandom (1994, 615; 2002, 263–65). 
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dichotomy. But in adverting to the forces explaining why we ever came to draw any 
kind of distinction between the lower and the higher in the first place, genealogical 
reflection also gives us the means to redraw the distinction in more realistic terms 
that are stable under reflection. The resulting distinction may not be always be clear-
cut. But just because a distinction is not clear-cut does not mean that it is no real 
distinction. As Wittgenstein once remarked, rejecting a distinction merely because 
it is not clear-cut would be “like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real 
light at all because it has no sharp boundary” (1958, 27). 
2. From Origins to Evaluation 
Thus far, I have argued that while genealogy traces the higher to the lower, it need 
not be understood as reducing the higher to the lower. Genealogy may not be 
reductive at all, and even where it is, the reduction may itself usher in a non-
reductive understanding of the opposition between higher and lower.  
 But once genealogy is thought of in non-reductive terms, the question arises of 
how the genealogically revealed connection between higher and lower affects one’s 
view of the higher. Two related ideas about this have gained currency: that genealogy 
must be thought of as merely preparatory, but not constitutive of the normative 
evaluation of the higher;26 and that insofar as a genealogy, however indirectly, feeds 
into normative evaluation, its contribution takes a primarily negative form: it 
destabilizes or unsettles received ideas, but it does not positively offer guidance for 
how to devise or fashion better ideas. 27  On this account, genealogy reveals the 
contingency of our arrangements and thereby conveys “a sense for the non-
 
26 See, e.g., Dutilh Novaes (2015, 100–1) and Koopman (2009; 2013, 20). 
27 See Lorenzini (2020, 2022) for critical discussions of this idea. 
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necessary” (Saar 2002, 217). This “frees us for social transformation,” but it “does not 
tell us precisely what to do or where to go” (Hoy 2008, 283). Genealogy liberates, but 
it does not guide. 
 Both of these ways of reining in the normative ambitions of genealogy can be 
motivated by a concern to steer clear of the ‘genetic fallacy’: the alleged mistake of 
inferring something about the normative status (i.e., the validity or justification) of 
something from propositions about its genesis (i.e., its origins or causal history). The 
distinctions animating the charge—between genesis and validity, explanation and 
justification, causes and reasons—trace back to Kant, who, perhaps reacting to the 
aforementioned pressure exerted by Enlightenment naturalism on Enlightenment 
rationalism, insisted on separating the quaestio facti—the question of fact, which is 
a matter of the factual origin of something—from the quaestio iuris—the question 
of right, which is a matter of the evidence for it.28 These distinctions were eagerly 
taken up during the ‘psychologism’ debates raging from the 1880s to the 1920s, 
when philosophers were keen to demarcate their work from the nascent discipline 
of psychology.29 The distinctions were further entrenched in the 1930s and 40s with 
the spread of logical positivism, and in 1934, the ‘genetic fallacy’ charge was 
explicitly introduced under that heading by Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel.30 In 
that period, the distinctions powering the charge derived their point not least from 
the need to counter the widespread and blatantly fallacious use of genetic reasoning 
to discredit ideas on the grounds of their alleged “Jewish origins”—the ideas of 
Einstein, notably, but also those of the logical positivists themselves.31 
 
28 See Kant (1998, A 84/B 116).  
29 See Kusch (1995). 
30 See Cohen and Nagel (1934, 388). 
31 See Giere (1999, 14) and Edmonds (2020, 29, 114–28, 38).  
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 Yet for all their utility at different junctures in their history, the distinctions 
animating the ‘genetic fallacy’ charge should not be inflated into dichotomies. Just 
because some reasoning from origins to justification is fallacious does not mean that 
every form of reasoning along these lines is. And just because some things are 
usefully classified as falling either on one side of these distinctions or the other does 
not mean that nothing defies such neat partitioning.  
 Once it is recognized that genealogy, though it traces the higher to the lower, 
need neither reduce the higher to the lower nor commit the genetic fallacy, this 
opens up two possibilities: (i) the genealogical connection to the lower can be used 
to inform an evaluation of the higher; and (ii) this evaluation of the higher can be 
used to guide us in moving forward. Where that higher element is a concept, 
genealogy can be a form of conceptual ethics—a critical evaluative reflection on 
which concepts we have most reason to use—and the resulting evaluation can in 
turn guide attempts to extend, revise, or improve our conceptual repertoire through 
conceptual engineering.32  
 Take evaluation first. A non-reductive genealogy can affect our evaluation of the 
 
32 I take the term ‘conceptual ethics’ from Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, b), though they 
make slightly broader use of it to include epistemological and methodological reflection on 
what should inform such evaluative reflection; see also McPherson and Plunkett (2020). 
On the relation between conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering, see Burgess and 
Plunkett (2020). The idea that genealogies of concepts can inform claims in conceptual 
ethics has recently been in the ascendant. It has been defended in those terms by Plunkett 
(2016) and Dutilh Novaes (2020). But the general idea that genealogies can inform one’s 
evaluation of their object has been advocated more widely (Geuss 2020, 69–82; Leuenberger 
2021; Lorenzini 2020; Prinz and Raekstad 2020; Srinivasan 2019; Testini Forthcoming; 
Thomasson 2020), and it is a staple of the literature on Nietzsche; see, e.g., May (1999), 
Richardson (2004), Owen (2007), Prescott-Couch (2014), Leiter (2015), and Reginster 
(2020) for different interpretations of Nietzsche to this effect. 
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genealogized object in more complex ways than a genealogy which simply identifies 
its object with something lower. It is a familiar thought that a genealogy tracing 
some respected higher element to “the will to power” or some other dark desire can 
be experienced as subversive of the higher. A less familiar thought is that when the 
lower element is an important practical need rather than some sinister motive, a 
genealogy tracing the higher to the lower can be experienced as vindicatory, which 
is to say strengthen confidence in the higher, especially if that higher element was 
previously suspected of being an otherworldly idea that no longer had a place in a 
modern, disenchanted understanding of the world. A genealogy can vindicate the 
continued cultivation of the higher element by showing that it is not just an archaic 
holdover or an irredeemable fetish, but an indispensable instrument to the 
satisfaction of an important concern. 
 To see how a genealogy can properly have this kind of evaluative force, it helps to 
think of genealogizing as a performative: in telling a genealogy, the genealogist 
performs a kind of speech act. When viewed in those terms, it becomes evident that 
a genealogy is not intrinsically vindicatory or subversive, but vindicatory or 
subversive for someone. This suggests that even a minimalist model of how a 
genealogy facilitates the evaluation of its object should be not just dyadic, with a 
higher and a lower element, but triadic. In telling a genealogy to someone, the 
genealogist connects: 
(1) the higher element whose origins the genealogy proposes to uncover; 
(2) the lower element to which the genealogy traces the higher element; 
(3) the genealogy’s addressee, who has certain values and normative 
expectations, including about what kinds of origins the higher element ought 
to have if it is to merit confidence and respect. 
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On this triadic model, a genealogy alerts the addressee to a certain connection 
between the higher and the lower element, and in virtue of the addressee’s values 
and normative expectations, that connection can be normatively significant in the 
eyes of the addressee and alter the addressee’s evaluation of the genealogized object. 
 The genealogies of Craig (1990), Williams (2002), and Fricker (2007), for 
example, aim to be vindicatory, and they ultimately all draw their vindicatory force 
from the idea that human beings have a very basic need to acquire more information 
about their environment than they can acquire on their own if they are going to 
survive in that environment and cope with its risks and opportunities.33 Given this 
need, it follows that human beings have a need to pool information through some 
sort of epistemic division of labour, and they accordingly need to develop and 
cultivate the concepts and dispositions that will enable them to pool information 
effectively. According to Craig’s genealogy, the original point of the prototype of the 
concept of knowledge is to equip inquirers to tap into the pool of information, in 
particular by enabling them to identify good informants on a given issue. According 
to Williams’s genealogy, the original point of the dispositions involved in valuing the 
truth intrinsically is to equip members of the community to be accurate contributors 
to and sincere dispensers from the pool of information. And according to Fricker’s 
genealogy, the original point of the virtue of testimonial justice is to enable recipients 
of information to neutralize the confounding influence of prejudice in drawing from 
the pool. These are genealogies of different aspects of the institution of testimony, 
and what promises to make them vindicatory for us is that they derive, from a need 
 
33 See also Craig (1986, 1993, 2000, 2007), Williams (1997, 2007, 2014), and Fricker (2009, 
2010, 2019). I offer detailed reconstructions of these three genealogies and highlight the 
connections between them in Queloz (2021b, chs. 6–8).  
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so basic and generic that we can hardly avoid sharing and endorsing it even now, a 
need for things that we did not necessarily expect we needed in that way, such as the 
concept of knowledge, the intrinsic value of truth, and the virtue of testimonial 
justice. 
 Yet the genealogies can only aim to be vindicatory; whether they in fact are 
depends on the third element in the triad: the addressee of the genealogy. Most 
basically, it depends on whether the addressee wants to see the need that is 
purportedly served by the higher element satisfied. The genealogy’s upshot can be 
thought of as taking a conditional form: if you care about the lower element, then 
you should care about the higher element. That is where the addressee’s own values—
what they endorse or condemn, what they regard as a legitimate concern and what 
as a mere caprice—are determinative. We might say that there is a normative 
division labour between the genealogy and the addressee. The genealogy channels 
evaluative valence from the lower to the higher, but the one injecting the relevant 
evaluative valences is the genealogy’s addressee, even though the way the genealogy 
is told by the genealogist of course affects what evaluative response is elicited from 
the addressee. 
 The addressee also comes into play in two further respects. One is that a 
genealogy’s effect is a function of the addressee’s prior knowledge. A genealogy is at 
its most powerful when the connection it uncovers between the higher and the lower 
is one that the addressee had either forgotten or never realized. A genealogy might 
transform someone from being suspicious of the intrinsic value of truth to being a 
staunch advocate and proselytizer of it, but only if it manages to show the addressee 
something he or she did not already know. This is not to deny that there is a role for 
genealogies that merely rehearse something familiar (and not just because human 
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beings are notoriously fond of hearing stories they already know); there is a role for 
genealogical narratives in forming and maintaining a sense of community or shared 
identity34—Lorenzini (2020, 3) aptly refers in this connection to the ‘we-making’ 
dimension of genealogy. But insofar as a genealogy carries evaluative force, it is at 
its most powerful when it is revelatory of something, and this makes its evaluative 
force dependent on the prior knowledge of its addressee.  
 The last respect in which the addressee comes in, finally, is in bringing certain 
normative expectations to the genealogy—expectations about what kinds of origins 
something ought to have if it is to merit confidence (as opposed to descriptive 
expectations about what kinds of origins something is in fact likely to have). 
Normative expectations can be represented as taking the form of a conditional and 
its contrapositive: if some higher element of such-and-such a kind merits confidence 
or respect, then it has such-and-such origins; if it lacks such-and-such origins, then 
it does not merit confidence or respect. 
 These normative expectations also contribute to determining whether a 
genealogy is experienced as vindicatory or subversive by its addressee, and when 
these expectations take a particularly demanding form (as they would in someone 
with a Platonic sensibility, for instance), then even genealogies aiming to be 
vindicatory, like those of Craig, Williams, and Fricker, will be experienced as 
subversive: if the value of truth needs to be traceable to a Platonic Form to merit 
confidence, then a pedigree showing it to have merely grown out of a set of mundane 
practical needs—however pressing—will fall short of the addressee’s normative 
 
34 Although that function is not specific to genealogical narratives; see Meretoja (2018) for 
a discussion of how narratives can bind people together and contribute to individual and 
cultural self-understanding. 
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expectations and discredit the value of truth. 
 This is where we encounter the ethical demand on a genealogy’s addressees to be 
realistic in their normative expectations. For if truthful genealogical inquiry takes 
place against the disenchanted, naturalistic Weltbild that forms its characteristic 
backdrop, Platonic normative expectations make a universal acid of genealogical 
reflection: all values, once truthfully and naturalistically genealogized, will fall short 
of those expectations, and nihilism—the dissolution of all values—beckons. And if 
the consequence of having such high normative expectations is indiscriminate 
genealogical subversion, then the needle of our moral compass should jump from 
modus ponens to modus tollens. Since we cannot reasonably want genealogical 
reflection to be indiscriminately subversive and issue in nihilism, we have reason to 
adjust our normative expectations so as to resituate the contrast between vindicatory 
and subversive origins within the range of origins that our values might realistically 
be expected to have. Our normative expectations cannot properly remain entirely 
independent of our descriptive expectations. The realization that certain normative 
expectations issue in indiscriminate subversion and nihilism itself yields an ethical 
reason to engage in expectation management.35 Much as genealogical reflection can 
lead us resituate the contrast between reason and power within a world in which 
everything is persuasion, therefore, it can lead us to resituate the contrast between 
vindicatory and subversive origins within a naturalistic worldview. In this sense, 
there is an ethical demand on the genealogy’s addressees to have realistic 
expectations. 
 This triadic model thus allows us to make sense, in highly general terms, of the 
 
35  I have argued elsewhere that something like this line of reasoning can be found in 
Nietzsche. See Queloz and Cueni (2019). 
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fact that a genealogical connection to the lower can be non-fallaciously used to 
inform an evaluation of the higher. But if we push further the question of what form 
this evaluation takes and what it can lead to, it begins to matter what exactly we plug 
into the lower place of the genealogy and what its relation to the higher is. This is 
why I have found it useful to carve off, under the heading of ‘pragmatic genealogy’, 
those genealogies that seek to explain the emergence of some higher phenomenon 
in terms of its practical effects by showing that those practical effects tend to be 
instrumentally subservient to the satisfaction of some concern (e.g., a practical need, 
interest, or desire) that explains the higher phenomenon’s retention.36 Insofar as the 
practical effects are nefarious in the eyes of the addressee and at risk of being realized 
going forward, the genealogy will be subversive. On the other hand, insofar as the 
practical effects are beneficial because subservient to a concern that the addressee 
wants to see satisfied and promise to continue to be beneficial going forward, the 
genealogy will be vindicatory. The genealogies of Craig, Williams, and Fricker are 
pragmatic genealogies of the latter kind. They reveal the continued subservience of 
their objects to concerns that are widely recognizable as important practical needs, 
thereby showing their addressees that these are ideas that help us to live.  
3. Genealogy as a Guide to Engineering 
This brings us, finally, to the second claim, that genealogical evaluation can also 
guide us in moving forward as we extend, revise, or improve our conceptual 
practices. Here an asymmetry emerges between subversive and vindicatory 
genealogies. While subversive genealogies tell us to move away from something 
without giving us any guidance as to what to move to, vindicatory genealogies do 
 
36 See Queloz (2017, 2018, 2020a, b, 2021b). 
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offer positive guidance in that regard. In a slogan: vindicatory genealogy is 
indicatory (of where to go from here). 
 The reason for this is that by presenting a cultural phenomenon—say, a concept—
as performing some function that we want to see performed, a vindicatory 
genealogy hands us a normative standard that can guide further elaborations of our 
conceptual apparatus. It tells us what work the concept can do for us, and this covers 
not just the work it already does for us when it functions well, but also the work it 
could do for us if it functioned better, or more often, or more widely. 
 Fricker’s genealogy of the virtue of testimonial justice offers an example. Rather 
than to begin with something that is already ubiquitous and to account for its 
ubiquity by showing that it answers to utterly basic human needs, Fricker does the 
reverse, arguing that the virtue of testimonial justice answers to utterly basic human 
needs and should therefore be ubiquitous, even though, at this point, it is clearly not; 
her genealogical derivation of testimonial justice presents it as something that we 
have only patchily achieved, and that “remains for the most part … something that 
we can and should aim for in practice” (2007, 98–9). This vindicatory genealogy 
guides us going forward, because it suggests that the virtue of testimonial justice is 
worth promulgating more widely than it has been. 
 Most basically, then, genealogy can guide the forward-looking project of 
improving our ways by helping us determine what we want from given concepts, 
values, or practices, and what it would mean for them to be better. Evidently, 
genealogy’s guidance in that regard is called for only when we do not yet know what 
we want from them; William Bateson did not need a genealogy of the concept of 
gene to know that he wanted the concept to help him explain and predict patterns 
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of inheritance.37 But with many of our concepts, we are not necessarily clear about 
what work, if any, they do for us. A good illustration is the concept of knowledge. It 
is ubiquitous in every sense of the term, but we are typically not in a position to 
rattle off the manifold functions it no doubt fulfils. And then a project in normative 
epistemology that wanted to ameliorate our concept of knowledge might take its 
guidance from a genealogy of the concept revealing what functions it performs. As 
Sally Haslanger writes: “the best way of going about a project of normative 
epistemology is first to consider what the point is in having a concept of knowledge: 
what work does it, or (better) could it, do for us? and second, to consider what 
concept would best accomplish this work” (2012, 352). 
 But genealogy can also guide conceptual innovation that goes beyond optimizing 
the concepts we have inherited for the kind of work they already perform. More 
innovative conceptual engineering may be called for in adapting our conceptual 
apparatus to changing circumstances or novel challenges, especially when these 
challenges are not best addressed using our existing concepts. 
 One of the best examples of this is the demand for conceptual innovation created 
by the increasing emergence and power of international institutions. Within liberal 
democratic nation states, there are long traditions of thinking about how to 
reconcile rule by state power with individual and collective freedom. There are 
concepts such as democracy, the rule of law, or the separation of powers that allow 
citizens to differentiate between legitimate exercises of state power and mere 
coercion. But these conceptual resources do not always travel well beyond the 
 
37 See Weber (2005, 195–96) for an illuminating account of the development of the concept 
of a gene, and see Brigandt (2010) as well as Brigandt and Rosario (2020) for a discussion 
of how changes in the concept appear rational in light of the concept’s aim. 
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context out of which they grew and to which they are tailored. Transpose the 
concepts of democracy, the rule of law, or the separation of powers from the domestic 
context in which they originated into the international realm of the United Nations 
Security Council, the World Trade Organization, and the European Court of Human 
Rights, and you soon find that these understandings of what renders exercises of 
power legitimate are, at best, only very partially applicable and realizable in this 
novel context. The resulting predicament is not just that the forms of power 
exercised by these institutions risk being experienced as insufficiently legitimated, 
but that these forms of power are held to a standard of legitimacy that they have little 
prospect of meeting, since it is a standard tailored to the nation state. 
 Hence, Damian Cueni (2020, manuscript) has argued that instead of trying, with 
limited success, to get international institutions to live up to our domestic concepts 
of legitimacy, we should genealogically reverse-engineer what it is that these 
concepts achieve for us in the domestic context to begin with, and then aim to 
recreate these achievements in the international sphere. Genealogical reflection on 
why we care so much about democracy, the rule of law, or the separation of powers 
within the nation state can then guide us in recreating what we care about beyond 
the nation state, but not necessarily in the same terms or along the same lines. This is 
to use pragmatic genealogy as a guide to conceptual innovation. It is conceptual 
engineering guided by conceptual reverse-engineering. The motivation for moving 
back first in this way is not just that it indicates a direction in which to move forward, 
though as the example of legitimacy beyond the state shows, that orientating 
function can itself be a valuable contribution of genealogical reflection. But moving 
back first also enables us to move forward more responsibly, with a deeper sense of 
what the concepts we aim to develop do, what they are connected to, and what 
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depends on them.38 
4. Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued for three main claims: that although genealogies, true 
to their Enlightenment origins, tend to trace the higher to the lower, they need not 
identify the higher with the lower, but can elucidate the relation between them and 
prompt us to think more realistically about both relata; that if we think of 
genealogy’s normative significance in terms of a triadic model that includes the 
genealogy’s addressee, we can see that in tracing the higher to the lower, a genealogy 
can facilitate an evaluation of the higher element, and where the lower element is 
some important practical need rather than some sinister motive, the genealogy can 
even be vindicatory; and finally, that vindicatory genealogies, unlike subversive 
genealogies, can offer positive guidance regarding where to move to from there. All 
three claims are ways of highlighting under-appreciated aspects of the potential and 
power of genealogy against those who would either identify it with reductive 
genealogical debunking or deny it any evaluative and action-guiding significance. 
And yet none of these claims should be particularly controversial. It should be a 
platitude that the cultural devices organizing human affairs have a history, and that 
when genealogically reconstructed in a suitably non-reductive form, that history can 
help us evaluate how these devices relate to our concerns, and how they might be 




38 On reverse-engineering as a means to responsible conceptual engineering, see Queloz 
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